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Can there be an Ethics for Institutional Agents?  
Sean Cordell 
At the time of this writing, following the disastrous fire at the Grenfell Tower residential building 
in London, BBC news reports that the Metropolitan Police has informed affected and nearby 
residents stating that they may bring charges of corporate manslaughter to ‘the Royal Borough of 
Kensington and Chelsea, and the Kensington and Chelsea Tenancy Management Organisation’. 
This is as a result of the Met’s investigations into allegations of gross negligence with respect to 
fire safety.1            
 In this example the three parties are institutional organizations that are doing, or may have 
failed to do, things which are morally considerable. It is the Metropolitan Police which deliberates 
over holding two other institutions to account for their allegedly failing in their duties, and the 
terrible consequences thereof. To the extent that they are in these ways morally responsible and 
praiseworthy or blameworthy, these institutions – whilst incorporating individual persons – are 
each themselves a kind of moral agent. Accordingly, similarities and differences between the 
institution (among other types of social group) and the individual moral agent have figured in 
various debates over whether, how, or in what sense(s) the institution or corporation can be a 
moral agent, a nexus of collective responsibility. 2        
 I also consider this type of similarity or dissimilarity, and what this can tell us about the 
moral agency of institutions. However, I take a slightly different standpoint from many of those 
debates, for my question arises on the assumption that an institutions can indeed have the status of 
moral agent. That is: If an institution can be a moral agent in some sense(s), then does it differ 
from the individual moral agent such that we should judge, morally, each kind of agent in a 
different way or according to different standards? I argue that whichever way we conceive the 
institutional moral agent, it mirrors an individual in some specific social role more than it mirrors 
the individual moral agent or person per se. ‘More than’ insofar as the agency of an institution is 
embedded in a certain kind of role and its normative standards, whereas the moral agency of the 
individual is not similarly embedded. This difference has implications for the normative status of 
institutions and the ethical stance we should adopt towards them.  
 
Institutions and their Minimal Moral Agency 
It is worth first stipulating the sense of ‘institution’ that will be relevant here. The term can of 
course meaningfully refer to something as diffuse and incorporeal as ‘the social institution of 
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Sunday worship’. But I refer to ‘the institution’ throughout to mean ‘the organisation’ within a 
subset of ‘Institutions’. As Geoffrey Hodgson has it:  
Institutions are systems of established and embedded social rules that structure social 
interactions. Organisations are special institutions that involve (a) criteria to establish their 
boundaries and to distinguish their members from non-members, (b) principles of 
sovereignty concerning who is in charge and (c) chains of command delineating 
responsibilities within the organisation’.3   
This also helps distinguish the institutional organisation from other non-institutional groups which 
can be organisations in some sense. A spontaneously rioting mob may be a kind of ad-hoc or 
ephemeral organisation insofar as it is a number of individuals organised as one into a rapaciously 
powerful unit, for example.4 However, is not an institutional organisation in our sense.   
  Where such an institution exhibits moral agency, it incorporates several individual 
agents and is thus a type of corporate, group or collective agent. By focussing on the 
organisational institution as this kind of moral agent, however, I do not mean to exclude other 
sorts of social groups’ status as possible moral agents or morally responsible entities.5 Rather, I 
argue that by virtue of being organised as an institution, certain features of the institutional 
organisation determine certain discrete normative standards, and thus to a significant extent shape 
its particular identity qua moral agent. Nonetheless, the institutional organisation is especially apt 
for ascriptions of moral agency and responsibility. Introducing the minimal sense of agency I will 
outline, Tracy Isaacs observes that: 
‘Organisations […] have clear role definition, decision procedures, and mechanisms for 
acting in the world that might be outlined in terms of corporate structures and policies, the 
specification of corporate interests and the like. […] Organisations are capable of 
intentional actions and are for this reason agents, even if in a minimal sense. Therefore, 
they are legitimate subjects of praise and blame’6  
As I see it, we ascribe ‘minimal’ agency to an entity when we sensibly ascribe it some 
level of responsibility but without having to establish in it such things as a body, mind, 
conscience, or personhood. 7 We do exactly this in the case of institutions when, in our best 
account of some deed or state of affairs, we coherently praise or blame an institution itself for 
decisions it makes, policies it formulates and carries out, cultures and practices it nurtures, or 
states of affairs it brings about or perpetuates. Institutions can also bear moral obligations to 
realise some good they can and are expected to bring about, or to improve some bad situation. An 
3 
 
industrial corporation’s polluting the river is either the result of its corporate deliberation and thus 
a corporate intention to pollute, or else it could rightly be held responsible for its negligence in 
failing to deliberate and act on reasons against polluting.8 To the extent it can be taken to task for 
doing or not doing these things, it is a minimal moral agent.     
 One could of course defend a conception of an institutional or collective agent more 
metaphysically laden than the minimal one, a well-known example being Peter French’s 
influential (and contested) corporation as ‘moral person’.9 As I see it, the minimal conception is 
sufficient as to illustrate the difference, which I explore, between the institutional moral agent per 
se and the individual moral agent. 
The Difference Thesis 
Baldly stated, some specific instituted role(s) or function(s) are basic to, and precede, the moral 
agency of an institution, whereas any particular social role(s) or function(s) is not basic to, and 
does not precede, the moral agency of an individual. To begin to substantiate this slogan, consider 
a teacher as one example of an individual role-bearer within an institution (one may choose any 
other). She is an individual moral agent who came at some point to occupy a teaching role. Her 
moral agency may be exhibited and developed qua teacher, but her status as a moral agent does 
not require her being a teacher. In fact, if there is any such dependency it is the other way around: 
we might reasonably suppose that moral agency is a prerequisite for occupying the teacher’s role. 
By contrast, the teaching institution (‘school’, or ‘college’, or ‘university’), derives its moral 
agency only from its constitution as that institution, where it has the capacity to do morally 
assessable deeds just by virtue of, and as a result of, incorporation of individuals within certain 
institutional structures. The institutional moral agent is embedded in and derivative of ‘school’ in 
a way that the individual moral agent need not be embedded in or derived from ‘teacher’. The 
statement “moral agent qua teacher” makes sense, and so does “school qua moral agent”. “Moral 
agent qua school”, however, fails to make sense in the same way. This discrepancy matters in 
terms of what we say about the moral conduct of each type of agent. Or so I will suggest. This 
difference and why it matters needs elaboration and defense. I begin by next looking at an 
explicitly ‘agent-based’ virtue-ethical theory which its proponent, Michael Slote, has attempted to 
scale up to the level of social and political institutions.  
Agent Based Ethical Theory and Institutions 
Slote has long defended an ‘agent-based’ variety of normative virtue ethics. ‘Agent-basing’, as he 
sometimes also calls it, ‘treats the moral or ethical status of acts as entirely derivative from 
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independent and fundamental aretaic ethical characterizations of motives, character traits, of 
individuals’.10 In his most substantial defense of this approach,11 Slote broadens its scope to social 
justice, and seeks to derive a conception of democratic social justice from virtuous motives such 
as appropriately balanced care for one’s political society:12    
If we think of societies roughly as groups of individuals living under or according to 
certain institutions, laws, and customs, there is an analogy between the relation the 
institutions, etc., of a society have to the (membership of the) society and the relation of 
individual acts to their agents. The laws, customs, and institutions of a given society are, as 
it were, the actions of that society—they reflect or express the motives (though also the 
knowledge) of the social group in something like the way actions express an agent's 
motives (and knowledge), though in a more enduring manner that seems appropriate to the 
way societies typically outlast the individual agents in them. And so just as individualistic 
agent-basing regards individual acts as morally good if they reflect morally virtuous 
motivation and wrong if they reflect vicious or deficient motivation, an agent based 
account of social morality will treat customs, laws and institutions as morally good 
(positively and admirably just) if they reflect virtuous (enough) motivations on the part of 
(enough of) those responsible for them as morally bad (or unjust) if they reflect morally 
bad or deficient motivation.13 
Slote is here addressing a problem that virtue ethics in general has not shown potential to ‘be 
systematically applied to both individual moral and political questions’. 14 Arguably, political 
philosophy’s distinctive focus is supra-individual concepts and structures and these things’ 
relation to individuals, whilst contemporary virtue ethics starts with the inner lives of individual 
moral persons. 15 Slote proposes to close this gap by drawing the justice of society and its laws, 
customs and institutions entirely from the admirable motivations and ethical character of agents. 
This offers both a counterpart to Slote’s individual agent-basing, and a political theory consistent 
with contemporary virtue ethics more generally. It starts with morally good (bad) aspects of a 
person’s character and from there derives judgments about the rightness (wrongness) of their 
actions.            
 Most interesting for our purposes is Slote’s suggestion that the agent in agent-based ethics 
– whose moral motives are the currency of right or wrong action – could be not only the individual 
person but also a morally motivated group agent at the institutional level of an entire society. Slote 
himself, on one hand, nods to a conception of this societal agent as an aggregation of actual 
individuals, when he says that agent-basing can evaluate ‘laws, customs and institutions’ in terms 
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of whether they ‘reflect or exhibit or reflect virtuous (enough) motives on behalf of (enough) of 
those responsible for them.’ On the other hand, Slote wishes to construe such motives in a way 
that is ‘more enduring’ and ‘appropriate’ to the changes in individuals’ membership of the 
relevant social group over time. This hints at, or at least allows for, a collectivist understanding of 
the societal agent, which would posit ‘society’ as a supra-individual collective agent which 
expresses and ‘acts’ on its own motives. Slote need not make a stand either way on the 
aggregative/collectivist question, insofar as a society’s institutions are for him ‘analogous’ to 
individuals’ actions. On another, metaphysically less committed, interpretation he could employ 
the explanatory notion of the societal quasi-agent, as a kind of conduit or repository of the 
apparent motives behind those institutions. On a counterfactual version of this approach, for 
example, the society’s institutions, customs, and so on could be evaluated morally in terms of the 
motives the society would be displaying in creating and sustaining these, were it a genuine moral 
agent.            
 Whichever of these interpretations Slote or we might favour, his proposal for a socially 
enriched version of agent-basing is put in terms of two sorts of motive-evincing moral agent: the 
large scale institution ‘society’, and the individual. Perhaps because he wants analogously to hold 
sub-societal institutions as the societal agent’s ‘actions’ and leave things there, he does not explore 
the further possibility lurking in his own analysis, of the sub-societal institution itself being a kind 
of moral agent. The institution ‘Police’, for example, might be morally assessable in Slote’s 
institutional terms as one of society’s ‘actions’. However, the ‘Metropolitan Police Force’, as in 
the earlier example, also has its own actions which we can assess morally – whether in Slote’s 
terms of reflection or exhibition of morally admirable motives, or in others. In what follows next I 
consider this application of agent-basing to institutions, and what it can tell us more generally 
about the difference between the individual and the institutional agent previously outlined.   
            
A Problem for Agent-Basing 
A fundamental and internal objection to agent-based ethical theory has been that it cannot wholly 
or satisfactorily do what it is supposed to, namely derive the justice or rightness of actions purely 
from the basic moral quality of agents’ motives. The objection is that to make sense of the agent’s 
being well-motivated with respect to effecting justice and rightness, the agent must grasp what just 
states of affairs consist of. So, if asked to say whether an agent’s action is just or right by virtue of 
whether it reflects or exhibits virtuous motivation, the objector’s answer is ‘“yes”, only if such 
motivation is properly concerned with and directed towards just states of affairs, and “no” if it is 
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not”. If this is right, then the agent in agent-basing appears not to be basic. The agent appears not 
to be doing the heavy work – the groundwork – in establishing the justice, thus the rightness, of 
their action, for the agent’s moral motivation is not here prior to the moral concept of rightness or 
justice. Thus, the theory appears at worst trivially circular and at best undermined in its own 
defining terms of ‘agent-basing’. The point of agent-basing is to get rightness, or justice, of 
actions from the moral quality of acting agents’ motives, not the other way around. 
 Slote recognizes and responds to this kind of objection in the case of the individual agent. 
He says that a properly virtuous motive, if genuinely held, will have to direct its possessor to look 
outwards to the world and at the relevant scope of any act which flows from that motive:  
If one morally judges a certain course of action or decision by reference to, say, the 
benevolence of the motives of its agent, one is judging in relation to an inner factor that 
itself makes reference to and takes account of facts about people in the world. One's 
inward gaze effectively “doubles back” on the world and allows one […] to take facts 
about the world into account in one's attempt to determine what is morally acceptable or 
best to do.16 
So the relevant scope for the well-motivated individual agent includes states of affairs and 
relations between people in one’s society. That scope, we can assume, includes certain social 
norms and obligations prescribed by social roles. Indeed, Slote provides an example of an 
individual in just such a role. Adapting Sidgwick’s case of the prosecutor who fulfils his duty to 
prosecute but does so from a motive of malice rather than that duty, he suggests that a ‘morally 
criticizable’ motive would be manifest if the prosecutor failed to fulfil that duty or attempted to 
recuse himself, where: ‘one very likely explanation will be that [the prosecutor] lacks real or 
strong concern for doing his job and playing the contributing social role that that involves’.17 The 
prosecutor would not be evincing a virtuous motive if he acted contrary to his role-duty, because 
in this case, his motivation would not properly take into account what qua prosecutor he is 
supposed to do.          
 My question now is not so much whether or how successfully Slote defends agent-basing 
with this response, but rather how it fares when applied to the institutional agent. The point in the 
example is that obligations attached to offices or roles must inform the deliberation of anyone who 
is properly virtuously motivated to act well qua the relevant office or role.18 This is so far, so good 
as an account of individuals’ moral motivation regarding role-obligations. However, the notion of 
the agent’s ‘doubling back’– gazing out at the world and incorporating role-external factors into 
the judgment of their internal motivational states – is differently problematic for the institutional 
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version of agent-basing. This problem illustrates more generally the key difference between 
institutional and individual agents discussed so far. 
Generalizing the Problem           
The individual agent bears obligations given by the prosecutor role which must figure in his 
morally good motivation when acting qua prosecutor. The moral agent ‘acting qua’ is important 
here, because whilst it is conceivable in the individual case, I think it is far less intelligible in the 
case of institutional agent. Taking on Slote’s behalf a view of individual moral agency which I 
take to be plausible, the individual in agent-basing is a moral agent by virtue of possessing a 
certain level of rationality and certain moral capacities. These include the ability to hold moral 
attitudes and affective states such as benevolence. We can on this view envisage a ‘bare’ moral 
agent who faces, and is subject to, various things out there in the world, including social 
institutions and the role-obligations they instantiate. At different points in her life she may or may 
not come to occupy some social roles and not others, and so be more or less subject to various sets 
of role obligations, and not others, at different times. On Slote’s view we can also deem her more 
or less a benevolent, caring or good person simpliciter and then, also, judge her benevolence or 
goodness with respect to these obligations.       
 So, were this agent to be at some point in her life a prosecutor – which qua moral agent or 
person she might never be – she would, as a moral person, gaze out and properly consider the role-
obligations established by the legal institution in which that role operates. Suppose now, in the 
analogous institutional case, we were to assess a legal institutional agent such as the high court 
similarly. Thus to decide if the court’s issuing the judgment is exhibiting or reflecting morally 
admirable motivation, we would need similarly to see whether, in being motivated to act, the 
institutional agent ‘court’ took into account the relevant factors such as requirements of law, of 
legal norms and any relevant constitution to which it is subject, and of precedents in the legal 
system in which it operates, and so on. However, in the case of the institutional legal agent rather 
than the individual one, how far ‘out in the world’, external to the agent, are these relevant 
factors? The analogy appears limited straight away by one side of it being ‘legal institution’, 
where it seems that part of that concept is the instituting of just these relevant factors. Legal 
duties, practices, structures and duties of offices are factors which do not sit external to this 
institution in a way that role-obligations can sit external to particular persons who occupy the role. 
For in the case of the court we appear to have an institution that is nothing if it is not all its legal 
offices, duties and powers. In this picture the moral agent cannot be individuated first as a person 
who lives in a world of institutions and their obligations who qua moral agent could – 
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theoretically at least – be abstracted from any particular set of those obligations in the form of 
some social role. Rather, it is having moral agency – aptitude for praise and blame and powers to 
do morally better or worse things – that is a consequence of its creation and maintenance as this, 
legal, institution. Insofar as it is a moral agent it is one constituted by its institution: its functions, 
purposes, and social structures, including the roles it specifies for its individual members.   
Objections and Responses 
It might be objected that the difference in the difference thesis, even if not entirely false, has so far 
been greatly overstated. One version of this objection is that the individual moral agent is not 
discrete from social roles and their obligations in the way, or to the degree, I have claimed she is. 
Another version, from the other direction, is that the institutional moral agent need not be so 
institutionally bound: it can be discrete from the institution in which it is established. Either or 
both ways, if there is such a thing as the institutional moral agent, then we need not worry too 
much about how it supposedly differs from the individual one in this respect.    
 Firstly then, it may be objected that the individual moral agent may not be so neatly 
detachable from normative demands of their social world, including their social roles. Individuals’ 
moral agency is in many – perhaps all – cases lived out, shaped by and manifest via many social 
roles and their obligations. In different cultures and historically, particular social roles have been 
assigned to individuals more rigidly to individuals than in modern societies. And individuals in 
modern societies can in fact be strongly mired in some social roles and their obligations, 
identifying strongly as parent, or professional, and so on.19 Arguably the occupancy of some other 
roles is non-voluntary and some role-obligations are non-contractual.20 So, social roles have a 
great deal to do with individuals’ constitution as moral agents. There is, nonetheless, some 
conceptual possibility of the moral agent’s role-independence, which obtains aside from the 
contingencies of social settings in which agents live. In warning of social structures’ ‘threat to 
moral agency’,21 Alasdair MacIntyre urges that an important feature of human moral agents is that 
they ‘understand their moral identity as to some degree distinct from and independent of their 
social roles’.22 For MacIntyre, our moral agency is imperilled if we fail to see this. As moral 
agents we have at least the capacity to scrutinize and question the socially determined norms and 
obligations to which we are subject in roles, no matter how strongly determined these may be. 
Regarding the current objection, it is worth adding to this point that one can recognize the actual 
force of role obligations on individuals within some social setting, but hold that the meta-
normative force of any social role, that is, the legitimate abidingness of its obligations, depends on 
its occupants identifying with that role or endorsing its demands.23 Commensurate with such a 
9 
 
view, someone may live in a society of strict filial norms, but nevertheless reject the ‘son’ social 
role and its norms by disowning one’s parent(s). An unjustly incarcerated individual may be 
literally forced into the position of a prisoner, but they can refuse either to identify as ‘prisoner’ or 
endorse the prisoner’s role. Even if it could be shown, for example, that individual moral agency 
will only develop or be fully expressed through individuals’ occupancy of some social role(s) or 
place in a social melee,24 it would not itself undermine the present point about moral agency in 
relation to social structures. The possibility of critical reflection on social roles, to the point of 
repudiation, is there in some degree for the individual by virtue of their capacities as a moral 
agent.             
 Note also that the particular type of institution relates strongly to the institution’s agency, 
in a way that a particular role need not relate to the individual’s moral agency. Even if it were true 
that the individual requires a role or a set of roles in order to be moral agent, it would not follow 
that they need occupy any particular role or set of roles in order to be a moral agent. The 
prosecutor may not have been a prosecutor, or have been ‘something’ else entirely, but still been a 
moral agent. By contrast, the court could not have been a moral agent at all were it not for its 
establishment as a legal institution. Institutional agency is not detachable from its instantiation in 
this or that institution.           
 So far I have claimed that the institution is first a type of social melee, incorporating its 
own specific tasks and obligations, before it can be a moral agent. Turning to the second version 
of the objection, one might question whether the moral agent in the institutional context is so 
tightly bound up with or constituted by its ‘host’ institution. For even if the moral agent does not 
pre-exist its institution, could it not survive it? Consider the case of a commercial corporation 
which comes to have, as it were, a moral life or character of its own that is not wholly defined or 
constrained by the institutional structures that gave rise to it. Subject to internal deliberation or in 
response to social and political pressures it might change its ways over time: for example, to 
become far more environmentally responsible. A shift in its structures, procedures, and policies 
could be due to its gradual adaptation to external social or economic pressures, or to proactive 
change through concerted intention of the institutional social group (members, staff, officers, 
leaders, and so on), or some of both. We can also find examples of an institution more directly and 
deliberately usurping its putatively constitutive role, purpose(s) and duties –  the putative ‘what it 
is there for’ – and for moral reasons. Suppose that a military unit initiates, en masse, a mutiny on 
grounds of conscientious refusal to fight an unjust campaign. In both these cases the moral agents 
seem to have repudiated their institutional constraints in the way that an individual moral agent 
might conscientiously relinquish their social role or refuse its role-obligations.   
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 It is true that in these examples each institutional agent alters or repudiates some of the 
features which gave rise to their agency qua that type of institution. However, in doing so each of 
them nevertheless is, or becomes in a sense an ‘institution’ on which their moral agency depends. 
This point relates to the importance of institutional agents being constituted partly at least by 
groups of individual persons (partly also by social structures, practices, and so on). However one 
sees the intuitional agent as constituted in this respect – as a single collective entity or an 
aggregation of individuals – its acting as a moral agent is conditional on its coming together – its 
being instituted – as such. In the preceding example the army unit agent has defied its mission and 
thus shaken off its defining institutional obligations. However, it does not thereby survive that 
institution and float free qua moral agent. Its continuation qua moral agent is contingent on its 
coming together qua agent in the pursuit of some other purpose or goal – ‘instituting’ in the sense 
just described qua ‘mutiny unit’. Put differently, it is hard to discern in that picture a surviving 
moral agent simpliciter: one that endures without some set of purposes, duties or institutional 
structures. Still missing is any coherent supra-individual agent that could live on without being 
instituted in some form or other. It would not be too much of a metaphorical stretch to ask 
rhetorically: ‘does this moral agent go anywhere if and when it no longer has an institutional 
structure of some sort?’25  
Institutions as a Subject of Ethics 
The difference between institutional and individual moral agents can be underlined by the ways in 
which we assess, or should assess, each of them and their actions. Sometimes our moral judgment 
of institutional actions can sometimes sensibly concern whether that institution should continue to 
exist or have ever existed in the first place, and a fortiori whether it should be an agent at all. 
Another such judgment concerns what purposes this or that institution should or should not fulfil. 
These types of judgments might on the face of it look structurally similar to a moral judgment that 
some individual moral agent should repent, change their conduct or reform their character, or even 
that they might be justifiably subject to the death penalty for certain heinous moral crimes. 
However, if the difference I have claimed is a plausible one, then one can in some degree always 
morally assess an individual person’s conduct qua moral agent – even if in relation to their 
institutionally defined social role obligations – where this kind of judgment is not apt for the 
institutional agent itself. For example, a proper forward-looking moral judgment of a member of a 
criminal organization might be that he should continue being a moral agent – and start being a 
better one – by not being a member. A proper and similarly directed moral judgment of the 
criminal organization would be that it should have no agency at all.     
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 For all this, it might be claimed that, in our moral thinking, we should view intuitional 
agents as something very much like individual ones. If a useful view of institutional moral agency 
need not be a metaphysically heavy one, then would it not be useful to conceive of institutional 
and individual agents as morally similar agents or quasi-agents with respect to our moral 
intuitions, theories and practices?          
 The first point to concede here is that we can and should, morally scrutinize certain 
conduct of some or any institution from a quiet general moral point of view. Plausibly there are 
some moral judgments which apply to any individual agent or to any institutional one. We should 
not want to allow any institutional agent of any kind to perpetuate injustice or carry out murder, 
for example. And the internal deliberation of an institutional agent itself might properly result in a 
judgment that it should or should not carry out some act or policy on the basis of some general 
moral principle(s).           
 However, even in cases of acts which might be ruled wrong under some moral principle, 
the moral status of many institutional deeds may itself depend importantly on the kind of 
institution carrying it out. Suppose that the army unit in our previous example does not mutiny but 
instead advances on the enemy with heavy, deadly, shelling. Assessing whether in this case the 
army agent would or would not be committing murder(s) or a war crime, or else a legitimate act of 
war, would warrant consideration of circumstances and conditions. Moreover, on a standard 
theory the assessment would include whether this mission was part of a just war and, even if so, 
whether it accords with principles of just conduct in war, for example. However, where this 
assessment is to be made in terms of the institutional agent’s conduct, the concept and role of 
‘army’ is inseparable from ‘conduct’. Particular ‘army conduct’ is thus ineliminable from such 
judgment of this particular institutional agent. Moreover, the point in relation to institutional 
versus individual agents is, once again, that in this assessment there is no assessable supra-
individual agent that is discrete from ‘army unit’, where there is at least the possibility of 
assessing a similarly situated individual’s conduct in relation to ‘soldier’. Contrast how we might 
judge a hospital’s engagement in deadly combat. In this case there would, it seems, be some 
illegitimacy built into the operation from the off. If medical institutions, and hospitals in 
particular, are moral agents then they are ‘moral agents with a primary duty to save and protect 
lives’, rather than moral agents per se who occupy a medical role, as an individual medic might. 
Unlike the army, medical institutions as agents do not have special permission and, in certain 
circumstances, a duty, to engage in large scale deadly combat with military weapons.  
 The crucial point is not that general or absolute moral principles fail to apply to 
institutional agents. Rather, it is that their application to institutions may get results different from 
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those yielded from their application to individuals. For example, an absolutist pacifist, who holds 
that no intentional killing is ever legitimate or permissible, could concede that the particularity of 
institutions relates to the moral quality of what each of them does. For, even on the view that 
killing is always in every situation absolutely wrong, a hospital that launches a deadly attack could 
in some sense be seen as doing a morally worse thing than an army unit’s doing the same. The 
consistent pacifist could say that in addition to doing something outright wrong, the hospital agent, 
but not the army unit agent, would be committing the wrongdoing of contravening its special duty 
and usurping its putative purpose to preserve life. By taking this view, the pacifist would in no 
way be tacitly exonerating or mitigating any institutional agents’ killings by virtue of their 
possessing special powers or duties to kill. On the contrary, the consistent pacifist’s assessment of 
the army unit’s operation may arrive at the conclusion that the establishment and maintenance of 
military institutions – and thus their agency – is just itself morally illegitimate. Here the pacifist 
strongly holds universal moral principles and apply them consistently. She will be applying them 
properly to a subject quite different from the individual moral agent, not only censuring this or 
that – any – moral agent for killing as such, but also saying specifically that we are best rid of this 
kind of institution and its agency altogether. Rid, that is, of any social and political institution that 
confers legitimacy on killing.  
An Ethics for Institutional Agents? 
I have said that seeing the institution qua moral agent as distinct from an individual agent, in the 
way I have claimed they are different, has a bearing on our attributions of moral responsibility to 
institutions and our practical treatment of their actions. How should all of this affect the general 
moral stance we adopt towards institutions qua moral agents? Generally, institutions as social 
entities and qua moral agents stand at the intersection of ethical and legal theory, and social and 
political philosophy (as a look back at the example of the Grenfell Tower fire might illustrate). 
Thus, an adequate normative theory of institutions may not be encompassed by just one of these 
approaches. But if institutions are distinct kinds of moral agents in the way I have claimed, it may 
not be covered either by combination of several extant theories taken from each approach.  
 One suggestion already made in this chapter has been that moral interrogation of an 
institutional conduct will raise the question of whether that conduct does or does not serve this or 
that institution’s function or purposes. A line of morally relevant enquiry might then concern 
whether or not we should sustain an institution that serves those function or purposes – or whether 
this institution should serve others instead. Developing this point, the ethical standards we apply to 
institutions’ conduct or existence relates to the concept ‘good of a kind’ in a way that those we 
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apply to individual moral agents are not.         
 This can be shown by comparison, again, with the moral goodness of the individual agent. 
Earlier, following MacIntyre, I argued that the individual moral agent can adopt a role-
independent standpoint which the institutional moral agent cannot similarly adopt. On which 
MacIntyre says further: ‘the answer that by one’s whole way of life one gives to the question 
“How is it best for a human being in my circumstances to live?”, is not to be equated with one’s 
goodness at being and doing what this or that role requires’.26 In response, he urges individuals’ 
cultivation of two general role-transcendent moral virtues: constancy and integrity. What, though, 
could such role-transcendent virtues look like in the case of the institutional agent?27 There may be 
features that any and all institutional agents might benefit from as organizations, such as 
solidarity, cohesion, or efficiency. Moreover, it may be true that a thin moral concept such as 
‘justice’ might count as a moral virtue in any institutional context. However, justice in such a 
context needs specific interpretation, by which what counts as virtuous is ‘contoured’28 by the 
particularity of the institution in question.         
 To return to Slote’s agent-basing, notice how the particularity of institutions rubs up 
against the generality of Slote’s basic moral motivations. For the sake of argument, suppose that 
we could find a basic morally admirable motive of care or benevolence manifested in legal 
institutions, in institutions of local or national government, in those of the civil service, in health 
or medical institutions, or in military institutions, for example. Consistent with what I outlined as 
the aggregative view, institutional moral motivation could be conceived in terms of common 
projects and joint commitments of relevant individuals within these institutions, for example.29 For 
it could be that similar basic moral motives drive several (and enough of) the relevant individuals 
and that these motives are exhibited in the general institutional context. However, what would it 
mean for the agent of the ministry of justice, or the UK National Health Service, the charity, or a 
university faculty to evince benevolence? Whether benevolence is manifest in each case will 
depend on the specific features, projects and aims this or that institution serves, 30 without which 
we struggle to get a grip on answering and saying what the manifestation of moral motivation 
should look like in each particular context.        
 Institutions and the agents they embody, then, characteristically carry out different tasks. 
Accordingly, they bear some special and particular moral obligations. In inferring the moral 
agency of institutions or corporations there may be the possibility of overlooking this, in seeing 
institutional or corporate agents as much like individual moral agents simpliciter. There is a 
danger in doing so which is not one that usually arises in discussions of group or collective 
agency, such as that of misappropriating responsibility to the collective rather than any 
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individual.31 Nor is it the opposite problem of blaming individuals who are not causally 
responsible or culpable for collective, corporate acts. Rather, on the contrary, it is in letting 
institutional agents off the hook of their special obligations. By virtue of their various and integral 
purposes the university, corporation, senate, army, charity, business or government each embody 
and comprise special or extra responsibilities that are not, similarly, born essentially by the moral 
agent simpliciter.            
 As suggested at the start of this chapter, institutions are most usefully conceived as moral 
‘agents’ in the sense that they do things. In light of the discussion, we can add that they 
characteristically do certain things for which they are, as it were, employed. Establishing the 
correct reasons for and terms of employment would be a distinctive task of an adequate 
institutional ethics, and this is the case whichever general normative political or moral outlook or 
theory one might favour. Pushing this line in one direction, insofar as we can evaluate them 
morally, institutions on this account can be conceived as akin to social or political artifacts which 
bear certain excellences and defects qua that kind of artifact. This has roots in the Aristotelian 
notion of characteristic activity – ergon – or function of a thing, and that of an institution being a 
kind of social artefact that is created for something. Touching on both these lines of thought, 
Aristotle claims that 
[a]ll associations come into being for the sake of some good - for all men do all their acts with 
a view to achieving something which, in their view, a good. It is clear therefore that all 
associations aim at some good 32   
Clearly there have been, and there are, venal institutions that will not be aiming at any good at 
all, except perhaps at a misperceived good, as in a racist organization, or some actual good of 
those who benefit but at the cost of a great evil, as in a criminal extortion gang. In such cases we 
should rightly want to eradicate such institutions. Correctly making judgments to that effect is 
surely a desideratum of institutional ethics. Ascertaining whose perceived good is being served, 
for which reasons, would be just as important for identifying evil institutions as it would for 
establishing and maintaining good ones, as would the means to diagnose and fix other less 
pervasive faults. Note, finally, that a concern of such an ethics would be not only the modification 
or eradication of existing institutions but also the generation of new moral institutions, by groups 
of individuals, including ones which resist established injustices and unjust institutions. Insofar as 
institutions are unlike individual moral persons and more like ‘agents’ in the sense of things to 
which we put uses, establishing their proper or best uses seems to me to be the crucial task. 33    
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